

6 | Fragile States and the Limits of Peacebuilding and Statebuilding

This book ends by assessing the current dominance of the peacebuilding/statebuilding axis. To what extent does it indicate the overreach of development policies and programmes in conflict zones? As seen throughout this book, the agenda of conflict and development has brought forth new dilemmas: how can soldiers, diplomats and aid workers work together in conflict situations? How do we classify development assistance in complex situations and not squeeze traditional poverty reduction programmes? Is aid always compromised in war-affected situations? How do we measure success? While more explicitly development-centred approaches to human security informed the early shaping of security and development programmes, there are concerns that the policy shift to fragile states in response to the reconceptualisation of threats may have changed the paradigm. Even in the face of the global and interconnected nature of insecurity across a range of issues, the notion of human security itself is under pressure as military and state-centric security re-emerges as the dominant interest.

The main criticisms made of contemporary peace operations in conflict-affected countries are the nature of their universal claims as defenders of peace and democracy, the top-down imposition of common approaches to programmes in different settings, a state-centric bias, the promotion of institutional rationality, and a dismissive approach to local realities. These critiques of the 'liberal peace' and the disparaging use of the term that now requires

quotation marks, also make certain assumptions about the concepts, actors, approaches and outcomes of the international peace, security and development architecture.

Current dilemmas of development and conflict

Securing whom from what?

The securitisation of aid is a major theme of the relationship between conflict and development and reflects the recurring tensions between human and military security outlined in Chapter 4. The concern with fragile states can be viewed in Duffield's words as the 'reproblematisation of security in terms of underdevelopment becoming dangerous' such that the role of development in peacebuilding and conflict prevention is recast within '[a] new security framework ... in which stability is now regarded as unfeasible without development, while development is non-sustainable without stability' (2001: 259). It is clear that the 'war on terror' has transformed understandings of security. Within the definition of human development, a focus on human security for poor people in the context of poverty has shifted to a concern with the threat the poor pose to global security. As Beall et al. point out, frequently in discussions of the security–development nexus 'it is unclear whose security is being referred to; a sharp distinction needs to be drawn between the security of those people in the countries where development is being pursued and security in the country of the donor' (2006: 60). The risks of merging counter-terrorism and development programmes is not simply the crowding out of poverty reduction as the basis for development, but the risk of contributing to the failure of development in all its dimensions and security in all its dimensions. The shift to a narrower counter-terrorism notion of security also generates a paradox whereby the central emphasis given to state–society relations and

negotiations in peacebuilding/statebuilding is directly challenged by the cover governments have received to undermine and label civil society groups and dissidents (Howell 2006).

Local engagement and ownership

Put simply, people must own their own peace: it has to begin, grow and become embedded in people's minds. It follows that peacebuilding can only happen within communities and within a country.... [I]t must go beyond mantra to substance. (UN 2010a: paras 17 and 19)

Reflecting a core critique of the neo-liberal interpretation of state-building and peacebuilding, Richmond (2008a: 113) sees such approaches as 'romanticising the local' in four particular ways to justify the top-down imposition of programmes and approaches: local people are viewed as exotic and unknown; as lacking capacity; as devious and not to be trusted; or as resources to be co-opted into projects. Critics themselves, however, are equally guilty of valorising the local without taking sufficient account of the range of actors for war and peace that constitute the local reality: peaceful NGOs cannot be the only actors for peace if sustained peace is to be achieved. Much of the commentary on local engagement treats the 'local' as monolithic, passive and imposed upon with no agency, resistance or negotiation on the parts of local elites, people and communities – and certainly no complicity in violence or threats to peace. The result is a uniform lack of any specific understanding of who exactly is local.

Béatrice Pouligny (2006) counters this with an analytic perspective titled *Peace Operations Seen from Below*, and gives substance to the ubiquitous calls for local ownership. In so doing, she problematises the 'local' as a varied and insecure space of many agents and drills down to the interactive dynamics of UN–local relations in different locations including El Salvador,

Cambodia and Haiti. She charts the way in which the new multi-dimensional peace operations may seem superficial, removed from people's lives, and yet simultaneously penetrate the fabric of the country and society in unprecedented ways: 'one may predict that [the interventions] potentially affect large components of these societies, precisely at a time when crucial elements of the relations between political and social order are renegotiated' (2006: x).

In this context, the UN interactions with local peoples are understood as 'plural and dynamic' rather than passive, and can also be both negative and positive. The actors who constitute the local space are many and cannot be reduced, she argues, to the simple separation of 'civil society versus failed state' – and individual actors, indeed, may take on a mix of sometimes contradictory roles to manage the fluid power relations in their environment in order to survive its instability (Pouligny 2006: 42–4). For example a local human rights activist being funded by a Western agency may also be a village elder, locally elected councillor and relative of the local warlord. The 'intermingling of allegiances and loyalties is often difficult to grasp' (2006: 56). The UN and other outside actors often do not fully understand or appreciate this fluidity, and need to give more attention to context analysis and the networks that mediate local relationships. As international actors become involved they are already part of these intermingling networks and are not always aware of the ways in which this positioning operates or is perceived. Decisions about who to partner with and fund may unjustly privilege certain well-placed local actors. The dance of partners includes an emergent and often weak government, also seeking out and cautious about local actors, and different community and development groups. Civil society is also often implicated in the conflict and its legacies – rather than necessarily being an alternative to a perceived failing state. Understanding the change dynamics of international engagement in this complex local context is therefore critical to success.

These debates on the nature of the 'local' and how to engage have a flip side in posing another dilemma: the role of experts on peace and development. Uma Kothari (2005b) provides a very powerful critique of the development 'industry' and the role of 'expertise' and 'experts' in reinforcing power relations of donor and recipient as 'self' and 'other'. In this she finds local articulation and forms of dissent are appropriated or rendered technocratic, and so robbed of their agency and autonomy. This power of the neo-liberal enterprise leads Kothari and others to see international development (most obviously in conflict-affected countries) as an extension or reassertion of Western colonial authority – a view that it is difficult, on the face of it, to dispute. Yet it is a very simplistic understanding of power as asymmetrical and top-down, and always a case of winner and losers. Similarly Oliver Richmond sees the peacebuilding approaches advanced in the new generation of peace operations as

'normalising' governance activities involving the transfer of liberal epistemology into conflict zones. This offers an ontology in which peace is plausible and positive within a framework of liberal governance, regulation and freedom, and a methodology in which its construction is simply a rational and technical problem-solving matter. (2008a: 116)

Yet these analyses assume capacities, coherence and coordination that is fictional; they do not reflect the inevitable and necessary tensions within international development interventions in conflict zones (not least the range of actors and agendas), what constitutes 'local ownership', and the lack of consensus about exit points for international interventions.

State collapse and alternative governance

Collapse means that the basic functions of the state are no longer performed.... As the decision-making centre of government, the

state is paralysed and inoperative: laws are not made, order is not preserved, and societal cohesion is not enhanced.... As a symbol of identity, it has lost its power of conferring a name on its people and a meaning to their social action.... As a territory, it is no longer assured security and provisionment by a central sovereign organisation.... As the authoritative political institution, it has lost legitimacy, which is therefore up for grabs, and so has lost its right to command and conduct public affairs.... As a system of socio-economic organization, its functional balance of inputs and outputs is destroyed; it no longer receives support from nor exercises controls over its people, and it no longer is even the target of demands, because its people know that it is incapable of providing supplies. No longer functioning, with neither traditional nor charismatic nor institutional sources of legitimacy, it has lost the right to rule. (Zartman 1995: 5)

In media and political coverage, peacebuilding and statebuilding have been referred to interchangeably or conflated with 'nation building' which is something quite distinct to statebuilding. As discussed in Chapter 2 with regard to nationalism and identities, the idea of nation refers to the generation of collective identity by people through culture, symbols and traditions that may or may not necessarily be tied to territory. The Western nation-state, where people and territory are coterminous, is a relatively recent phenomenon following long decades, even centuries of evolution (Tilly 1975). This idea of nation and the quite distinct idea of state (which focuses in essence on the development of organisation and structures of national and local government) have come to be conflated and confused in describing governance and development approaches in conflict zones. The terms nation building and statebuilding go beyond technocratic prescriptions of rule of law, constitution building, and delivery of public services to signify the loaded political debates of global, unilateral Western intervention and regime change in

Afghanistan and Iraq, neo-colonial governance in the experiences of transitional administration in Kosovo and Timor-Leste, and neo-liberal designs of the nature of peace in all these cases and extending to the DRC and Sudan. Yet at its heart state-building remains a concern about functioning states in an international order that can protect and provide for their people and ensure internal and external security. Nation building without the grandiosity is revealed to be the social contract of state and society in terms of legitimacy and accountability. It is also about the basic delivery of services to citizens to enable a functioning society and economy.

The 'transitional administration' mandates of the UN in Timor-Leste and Kosovo are examples where the UN, on behalf of the international community, has governed in a trusteeship manner. This has brought with it shades of the arrogance of power, on the one hand, and, on the other, the 'destined to fail' impossible aims of sweeping mandates and expectations to build a state within 6–12 month mandate extensions and arduously negotiated and inevitably insufficient budgets. On 27 September 2002 Timor-Leste became the 191st member of the United Nations and the world's newest independent state, having declared independence on 20 May 2002 following a referendum in 1999 and an interim UN administration during 1999–2002 (UNTAET).

The mandate of this mission was overarching: UN Security Council Resolution 1272 (1999) made the UN the *de facto* government of the country to prepare for independence. The mission, under the leadership of the Secretary-General's Special Representative Sergio Vieira de Mello, was 'endowed with overall responsibility for the administration of East Timor and ... empowered to exercise all legislative and executive authority, including the administration of justice'. While considered successful in terms of the declaration of independence for East Timor in

Independence in Timor-Leste

Independence marked the end of a long and brutal history of colonialism, occupation and resistance. Colonised by Portugal, and occupied by Indonesia (1975–99), a post-independent Timor-Leste state faces significant challenges in forging a national identity, constructing national dialogue, building the capacities of government across the board, and ending the poverty and marginalisation of its people. With a population of just over one million people, defined by a fast-growing young population and high fertility rate (7.8), Timor-Leste holds many possibilities and risks that are intertwined in its push to build its state, economy and society. Notwithstanding regional factors such as the dominance of Australia and relations with Indonesia, as well as national income from oil resources off the coast, the conflict risks and challenges faced by Timor-Leste have a strong internal dimension.

The independence of Timor-Leste has been defined by the shifting mandates of five UN missions. The United Nations Mission in East Timor (UNAMET) (June–October 1999) was a political mission mandated to organise and conduct a popular consultation to ascertain the future status of East Timor. The United Nations Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET) (October 1999–May 2002) was a peacekeeping operation established by the Security Council following rejection by the East Timorese of special autonomy. It exercised administrative authority over East Timor during the transition to independence. The United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor (UNMISSET) (May 2002–May 2005), also a peacekeeping mission, was mandated to provide assistance to the newly independent Timor-Leste until all operational responsibilities were fully devolved to the national authorities.

Once the peacekeeping mission withdrew, a new political mission, the United Nations Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL) (May 2005–August 2006), supported the development of critical state institutions and the police, and provided training in observance of democratic governance and human rights. The UN returned in force following the 2006 crisis, in the form of the ongoing United Nations Integrated Mission in Timor-Leste (UNMIT). It has an extensive mandate covering policing, capacity

building for policing, security sector review, national dialogue, and working with government through the UN agencies, funds and programmes (UN Country Team) on implementing national development plans. This mandate is expected to be reconsidered, with possible draw-down of the mission, following the 2012 elections. There is pressure for UNMIT to support the government in establishing key foundations in terms of security and national dialogue before the inevitable draw-down of the mission.

2002, the mission has been subject to hard-hitting criticisms. One major critique is the lack of local contacts and engagement by the mission, and the failure to deliver dividends of reconstruction and services sufficient to secure the new country against state failure (Chopra 2002). Another assessment suggests that the mission was simply not equipped to fulfil its governing and statebuilding mandate and was geared for peacekeeping rather than nation building (Suhrke 2001). Paris (2004: 220) has a more constructive view of UNTAET's mission, seeing it as a demonstration of the usually lacking international commitment to the long haul. He describes the transitional administration as a 'model of assertive peacebuilding' owing to the 'willingness of peacebuilders to assume full responsibility for the reconstruction of a functioning state apparatus'.

However, the nature of the state that emerged from international support (not just the UN, but leading donors including Australia, Portugal, Japan and, increasingly, China) needs reflection, too. The adage of 'humpty dumpty' is apt: all these king's horses and all these king's men have not been able to put it together again. Statebuilding in Timor-Leste has been fraught with the tensions and paradoxes of its colonial legacy and current experience of international involvement. A thorny issue is the heavy reliance upon, and high aid costs of, a rapidly revolving cadre of international advisers in government ministries: concerns

about high salaries and the qualifications and experience of many personnel have been expressed. The adoption of Portuguese as an official language of the country and the use of English as the *lingua franca* of the international presence, in a context where most of the population do not speak either language, have deep implications for capacity-building efforts and also affect directly the ability of people to claim rights and services – most notably in access to education and justice. Tetun (an official language) and Bahasa (Indonesian) are widely spoken in the country.

International interest in Timor-Leste gained new momentum in the aftermath of a crisis in 2006 prompted by splits within the army, and between the army and police, that spilled over into clashes on the streets and resulted in some 42 people being killed, at least 40 being injured, and over 70,000 people displaced.¹ The violence triggered a wave of attacks across the country, including beatings and house burnings as many grievances erupted, unchecked. A review of donor practices in the light of the 2006 crisis, commissioned by the Norwegian aid agency NORAD, highlights the extent to which development actors had neglected the risk of conflict or violence in the design of their programmes in the 2002–6 period. The review assesses how far aid policies and spending compounded imbalances that contributed to conflict tensions – finding an overemphasis on statebuilding in the capital and central government, insufficient attention to micro-economic and employment efforts, and a lack of focus on the emergence of political and economic exclusion across the country (Norad 2007).

Fresh presidential and parliamentary elections in 2007 were marked by controversy as FRETELIN, the party that grew from the Timorese resistance to Indonesian occupation, was voted out of power and initially resisted accepting the outcome. A further flashpoint was provided by attacks on the President and Prime Minister in February 2008 by renegade army officers. However,

these flashpoints in themselves are seen as symptoms of more systemic and historical tensions and unresolved conflicts in Timor-Leste; they threaten to become cleavages for future, more violent conflict if they are not fully addressed. There is a consensus among local and international actors that these issues include: the proper functioning of police and army in a democratic state; a process of national dialogue along with a strengthened and functioning justice system to heal the past and build foundations for a shared future; building the capacities and functions of state, economy and society; and delivering tangible evidence of peace and development to the people of Timor-Leste, almost ten years after independence.

The limitations of international support to Timor-Leste do not remove the need and responsibility for political leaders to lead the building of appropriate state institutions accountable to all citizens. In this they collectively face the challenges of overcoming urban–rural, generational and gender tensions and disparities, and addressing the enduring legacies of the long war of independence: human rights atrocities and delayed justice; revolutionary faction fighting; and unfinished demobilisation and reintegration. Timor-Leste reflects the necessary international, national and local interactions and tensions that define post-conflict development and peacebuilding.

State fragility may entail assistance and international interventions, as part of search for legitimacy and resilience, that have the counter-productive potential to destabilise and be in themselves a cause of external shocks: the infamous World Bank economic structural adjustment programmes of the 1980s are a salutary example. Paris (2004) advocates ‘institutionalisation before liberalisation’ as a remedy to the quick fixes and rushed benchmarks (such as elections) of the first wave of new UN peace operations that faltered or relapsed into conflict. In his analysis, peacebuilding and statebuilding are not events but processes of

preparing for peace and development on a sound basis of endogenous institutions, both to assure governance and to 'minimise the detabilising effects of the liberalisation process' in fragile post-conflict settings.

Current configurations of statebuilding and peacebuilding can also learn from the debate in development circles about 'good enough' governance as a counter to the long list of policy agendas and perfect models. Grindle (2004: 535) suggests that a 'good enough' governance agenda would be based on 'a more nuanced understanding of the evolution of institutions and government capabilities; being explicit about trade-offs and priorities in a world in which all good things cannot be pursued at once; learning about what's working rather than focusing solely on governance gaps; taking the role of government in poverty alleviation seriously, and grounding action in the contextual realities of each country'.

Rethinking state failure in Somalia

Somalia presents a conundrum to the international community: the ultimate failed state is also testimony to the nature of resilience *without* a state, and thus dislodges a basic assumption of the conflict and development agenda – that underdevelopment begets war begets underdevelopment in self-perpetuating crisis (Bradbury 2008; Berdal 2005; Menkhaus 2004). The sources cited stress that they are not underplaying the nature and extent of violence and instability in Somalia, but emphasise that international aid and military intervention have largely failed – and failed to take account of what makes Somalia resilient.

Mark Bradbury examines how Somaliland, in the north-west of the former Somalia, defies the premises of peace building as 'a self-governing territory' that is not a state but demonstrates aspects of statehood – including an elected government, collection of taxes,

management of services and borders, intervention in the market and provision of security for citizens. Somaliland reveals through cattle exports, banking and trading how a vibrant economy operates without the formal workings of a state and is inserted into the globalised political economy in various ways. Bradbury argues that '[o]ne of the paradoxes of international engagement in Somalia is that while diplomacy and statebuilding have focused on re-establishing a sovereign government Somalis themselves have fashioned varied forms of governance within the territory of the former Republic' (2008: 245). He cites other factors for the emergence of Somaliland as 'a stable polity' that include an active civil society, reliance on customary law and the traditional leadership of the pastoralist economy and society. He terms this phenomenon 'pastoral democracy' in a fusion of traditional and modern governance practices to restore order, provide security to citizens, mediate power relations and establish property rights and ownership.

Matt Berdal (2005: 697) highlights the 'the self-generated demobilisation process' that defies international DDR and SSR approaches: 'Developments in local governance over the past decade or so also help to explain the striking success of the disarmament and demobilisation of ex-combatants in Somalia since 1994; striking because it has occurred in the absence of central government, unaccompanied by security-sector reform and national reconciliation, and without any assistance from external actors.' The case of Somalia invites the international community to look not only to the collapse of government or the failures of development for the chronic situation, but also to the failure of aid and military interventions, and to look more closely at what survives and how it survives.

Mark Bradbury, in writing about Somaliland (2008), calls for 'greater diplomatic creativity' and 'international acceptance of alternative formulations of state governance'. Such alternatives are also considered by Alex de Waal (2009) in his counter argument to liberal institutions as he considers contexts where

‘social affinities and patronage networks’ may hold greater sway and where the ‘patrimonial marketplace’ is the organising mechanism as influence is negotiated and traded in various ways with internal and external actors. These analyses of alternatives apply more widely and need to be engaged more seriously by the international architecture of missions, resources and efforts.

The Afghanisation of development as peacebuilding

The exceptional cases of Iraq and Afghanistan are both driving changes in the understanding and practice of peacebuilding and statebuilding, posing significant challenges and dilemmas for the role of international development. This speaks to a social contract model of post-conflict development whereby states provide core services (and security is now defined as a service alongside health, education, sanitation or the rule of law) to its people in a functioning government and administration. The other side of the contract is that people need to be able to hold their governments and leaders to account and to engage as citizens in the post-conflict state. This requires the strengthening of civil society organisations and state–civil society relations, as well as civilian oversight of governmental processes and institutions.

What its critics term the ‘liberal peace’ in the form of present-century peace operations in a range of settings was changed by the US invasion of Iraq in the face of much opposition, not least within the West. The invasion of Iraq reframed Afghanistan as a similar insurgency situation when indeed the initial military intervention in 2001 was supported by the UN Security Council and many UN member states in the aftermath of the 9/11 attacks in New York. International goodwill was squandered on Iraq to the detriment of any future arguments for humanitarian intervention or responsibility to protect in situations where there is threat of genocide or evidence of large-scale human rights abuses (Williams 2006; Sisk 2008).

The relationship between development, military presence and diplomacy has changed over the past decade. International responses to conflict in Iraq and Afghanistan have changed the context of action significantly. One revealing development has been the setting up of provincial reconstruction teams (PRTs) as civil–military multi-disciplinary teams to work in highly insecure areas in Afghanistan on related security, governance and development tasks and projects. They first became operational in 2002 and there are currently some 23 Coalition- and ISAF-managed teams. Humanitarian actors in particular do not welcome the civil-military ethos and structure of PRTs, revisiting their unease at the ‘new humanitarianism’ mentioned in Chapter 4. They view the PRTs as reducing the humanitarian space in wars with no front-line, compromising the humanitarian principles of impartiality and neutrality and going against well-established guidelines and codes of conduct on humanitarian assistance – including those prepared by the Red Cross and the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (Gordon 2010; Runge 2009).

Another development in Afghanistan and Iraq has been counter-insurgency tactics and operations that go beyond the ‘integrated approach’ involving military, diplomatic and development organisations highlighted in Chapter 4. ‘Hearts and minds’ campaigns cannot be equated with development projects and approaches and neither can development hope to protect itself with flags and emblems; the regular targeting of aid workers for kidnap and killing, and the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad in 2003, are stark reminders of the collapse of any boundaries between war and development. As Howell (2006: 129–30) observes,

Military personnel have appropriated the language of development, civil society and rights to dilute their militarism and to gain support locally. This strategy of ‘hearts and minds’ has taken

various forms such as handing out sweets to children on the streets, distributing leaflets portraying the enemy in a negative way, building schools, hospitals and wells, and delivering food aid.

One suggestion by Howell (2006: 131) is the need for humanitarian and development NGOs to consider becoming 'nationless', thus 'asserting greater control over the construction of their own identities'. Yet humanitarian and development interests now constitute a global power and industry in their own right and so should not be seen as victims of circumstance in the struggles for meaning and action on conflict and development; there is money to be mobilised by conflict-related programming, as indicated in Beall et al. (2006). During 2008, aid flows to 43 listed fragile and conflict-affected countries totalled US\$33.2 billion, some 30 per cent of global ODA; over 50 per cent of this was allocated to six countries (in descending order: Afghanistan, Ethiopia, Iraq, West Bank and Gaza, Sudan and Uganda). ODA-related security activities rose from US\$974 million in 2007 to US\$1.5 billion in 2008 – mainly on peacebuilding, conflict prevention and resolution (OECD DAC 2010a).²

And not all soldiers are stereotypes, either; while counter-insurgency is certainly a part of the Afghan landscape and soldiers are there to stabilise and secure territory and confront the Taliban, they are also undertaking tasks that go beyond their conventional remit. The civil–military transfusion flows both ways. The implications and impact of increasingly civilian duties and contacts undertaken by soldiers present an issue that requires greater reflection. Peacekeepers have come under fire, too, for failures of protection and the abuse of authority. This also has to be addressed and put in the context of a long history of peacekeeping where many populations see them as the only real response of the outside world to their plight – when they failed to turn up, notably in Rwanda, their absence was not forgotten. There is a

need for more shades of grey in debates about the interactions of the different actors on the ground.

This Afghanisation of international responses is beginning to reveal itself in international and bilateral organisations. Staff who have served in Afghanistan, and perhaps won promotion there, are now being given charge of regional or global aid and conflict portfolios in other parts of the world. There they face different challenges, not least cultural, and if these are not to become excuses for inaction or the inappropriate application of the Afghan lessons, they have to be understood and discussed with some humility. The consensus that is now in place on ‘conflict and fragility’ as a catch-all term for a myriad of conflict and post-conflict situations ranging from Azerbaijan to Zimbabwe – with Afghanistan, Iraq and Sudan in between – needs to be filtered through a rigorous process of analysis and understanding if it is to inform policies and programmes in very different contexts.

*The quality of peace*³

There is a certain paradox in the evolution of ‘peacebuilding’ as a policy watchword to guide international interventions given its alternative (and some would say primary) origins as a grassroots concept intertwined with conflict resolution. Conflict resolution aims to prevent, bring an end to, and transform violent conflict. Its immediate aim is to end hostilities where they have broken out or to prevent escalation of a dispute to the point where hostilities will break out and widespread violence and death will occur. The underlying aim of conflict *resolution* is to address the *root causes* of conflict, such as discrimination against minority groups, and to put in place an institutional and enabling environment for peace to ensure that violence will not break out or recur. The institutional architecture and norms around international conflict can be traced back to the founding of the United Nations in 1945, notably Chapter VI of the UN Charter with a focus on Pacific

Settlement of Disputes. Article 33 outlines the range of actions including 'negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice'. It also includes the 'good offices' (diplomacy) of the UN Secretary-General or Envoys. In terms of 'An Agenda for Peace' (Boutros-Ghali 1992), peacemaking efforts can be pre-emptive or *preventive* of conflict before it erupts: that is, preventive diplomacy. This emphasis on resolution has very strong foundations in religious, cultural and civil peace organisations that have promoted 'peacebuilding from below' stretching back through time.

Some argue that conflict resolution is a distinct undertaking that needs to be free of development structures and technocracy. Simon Fisher and Lada Zimina (2009) distinguish between 'technical' and 'transformative' peacebuilding – the former being the preserve of the 'peace industry' (including the expertise developed in the institutions discussed in Chapter 4) and the latter being driven by social movements – and argue for conflict transformation as the objective of peacebuilding and the key factor determining the quality of the peace being sought.

Kenneth Bush (the advocate of PCIA, cited in Chapter 3) considers the indigenous nature of peacebuilding to be the defining feature of the quality of the peace.

It should be underscored that peacebuilding is not about the imposition of 'solutions', it is about the creation of opportunities, and the creation of political, economic, and social spaces, within which indigenous actors can identify, develop, and employ the resources necessary to build a peaceful, prosperous, and just society. Peacebuilding is a two-fold process requiring both the deconstruction of the structures of violence and the construction of the structures of peace. (Bush 1998: 33)

Bottom-up peacebuilding can also be seen by activists and groups as a way of holding donor and post-conflict governments

and international and regional organisations to account as peace-building moves from rhetoric to practice. The DFID embrace of 'positive peace', for example, deserves closer scrutiny. How does it translate in practice? And are governments the only or best-suited agents to support and enable genuine positive change?

In the light of 'governance alternatives' discussed above, and the matter of whose security is being assured, the issue of accountability obviously arises. The notion of the social contract between government and citizen, state and society, is central to the globally dominant statebuilding/peacebuilding nexus. Much emphasis is placed on the ability of people to claim rights and services from their governments, and to have the means of holding their leaders to account. This focus on elite governance, at the centre of the state in the provision of services, is according to Richmond (2008a; 2008b) a 'virtual peace' and not really peace at all. Richmond and Franks (2009: 86) consider that success in terms of peace must be posed as some type of 'self-sustaining situation'. In order for this to be the case the harnessing of accountability is not only a matter of national governance but also international governance and legitimacy – where those who intervene are accountable to the people on whose behalf they claim to act. This too affects the quality of peace.

Conclusion

The use of development aid as an instrument of foreign policy in pursuit of political and/or military security objectives, beyond any stated or intended moral or altruistic motives, is not new. What is new is the alignment of aid with shifting notions of security in complex contemporary wars, and within complex international responses that have increasingly professionalised and rendered technocratic the nature and outcomes of develop-

ment assistance in war-torn countries. The institutionalisation of conflict-related aid has to some extent made it more mobile and flexible (no longer waiting in the wings but now engaged in ‘transition’ from relief and supporting ‘early recovery’) in terms of timing and deployment in situations of ongoing or post-conflict violence. However, critics point to the need to understand and engage local people, society and institutions, to consider alternative forms of governance beyond and beneath the state in the search for stability and peace, and to promote more open debate on the politics of aid and security.

The shifting normative and policy parameters of international responses to protracted conflict in the Global South towards the recent discourses of statebuilding, peacebuilding and counter-insurgency mean that aid as a resource and normative aim in its own right has become subject to dominant and different objectives of intervention (stabilisation, counter-terrorism, fighting organised crime, preventing migration). This potentially compromises the moral foundations and justifications for aid.

Yet it can also be argued that the dilemmas of aid policy and programmes in conflict zones mirror the larger dilemma of how best to respond to contemporary conflicts. What outcomes are realistic for international interventions and likely to be supported by a more cynical tax-paying global public? How can support be provided to what works, even when it does not fit the models being promoted? How can conflict transformation rather than conflict management or ‘do no harm’ become more central to the relationship of conflict and development? And indeed, should it be central to that relationship?

Yet defining all interventions as part of some neo-liberal imperial project oversimplifies the causes, drivers and impact of conflict in many regions, as well as the challenging prospects for reducing violence and promoting any form of peace – negative or positive. Structural critiques endure with some merit on the

ambition and failures of late twentieth-century international peace operations, but the scathing nature of such critiques can often overstate the extent to which these concerns tip over into 'neo-imperialism' or some form of neo-liberal conspiracy. Rather than understanding and addressing the failures or examining the intentions of international engagement in conflict situations, the overreach of development has simply been abandoned. No feasible alternatives are offered or studied.

Asymmetrical warfare⁴ is part of that complex picture; so is growing militancy and terrorism as a form of violence, and the counter-terrorism to prevent and fight it; but so too are corrupt governments, and an aid industry defined as much by the proliferation of international NGOs arriving in disaster zones as it is by the technocracy of the UN. It remains an imperfect world. It may be that development is charged with being the 'intellectual handmaiden' of the status quo and a bulwark for neo-liberal adventurism in international conflicts – and yet the ideas and programmes discussed here also reveal a radical agenda of change, one that does not accept conflict as inherent and seeks instead to transform the causes and courses of conflicts at many different points. Mistakes have been made and the real failure may be overreach in advancing this agenda for conflict prevention and peacebuilding through development policies and programmes, but it does not necessarily follow that the aim itself should be abandoned.

The potential directions that emerge from the debates and issues outlined here as the conflict and development agenda include suspending aid and realigning domestic budgets accordingly, scaling back the ambitions of all international efforts, and enabling global civil society to take more of a lead on peace and development issues. The nature of this debate is important, as there is a need to reconsider the role of development in conflict situations and to find ways through the polarising tendencies of

current debates if responding to international conflict is to remain a global concern. This requires some humility on the part of both academics and practitioners in learning from the post-Cold War experience and reconsidering the main questions. What international objectives, resources and outcomes can feasibly be expected and pursued? And how best can national governments and societies in conflict-affected countries be supported in shaping their own visions and efforts for something called peace and something called development?