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United Nations Disengagement Observer Force

Report of the Secretary-General

I. Introduction

1. The present report provides an account of the activities of the United Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) from 21 February 2024 to 20 May 2024, pursuant to the mandate set out in Security Council resolution 350 (1974) and extended in subsequent Council resolutions, most recently resolution 2718 (2023).

II. Situation in the area of operations and activities of the Force

2. The ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic was generally maintained, notwithstanding several violations of the Agreement on Disengagement between Israeli and Syrian Forces of 1974. The overall security situation in the UNDOF area of operations remained volatile, with continued military activity in the areas of separation and limitation, and across the ceasefire line, in violation of the relevant Security Council resolutions, including resolution 2718 (2023).

3. In employing its best efforts to maintain the ceasefire and to see that it is scrupulously observed, as prescribed in the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, UNDOF reports all breaches of the ceasefire line that it observes. All incidents of firing across the ceasefire line, and the crossing of the ceasefire line by aircraft, drones, military vehicles and personnel, as well as other individuals, constitute violations of the Agreement. In its regular interactions with both sides, the leadership of UNDOF continued to call upon the parties to exercise restraint and avoid any activities that might lead to an escalation of tensions in the region.

4. On two occasions on 22 February, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that it should advise its personnel in the central part of the area of separation to go into shelter. This followed explosions in the area of operations from what UNDOF assessed to be the Israel Defense Forces Iron Dome air defence system, activated to intercept firing from Lebanon towards Israel. On both occasions, UNDOF personnel in the area of separation and Camp Faouar went into shelter, where they remained for approximately 30 minutes until the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that it was safe for the United Nations personnel to come out of the bunkers. The Israel Defense Forces also conveyed to UNDOF that "rockets were fired into Israeli territory towards the Golan Heights". In addition, on two occasions on the same day, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that all United Nations personnel on the Alpha side (Israeli-occupied Golan) must go into shelter until further notice, and later relayed that it was safe for the personnel to leave their bunkers.

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5. Also on 22 February, United Nations personnel at observation post 53 observed explosions in the area of separation and the area of limitation on the Alpha side. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that it had targeted and injured a member of "the Golan Project…involved in the planning of various terrorist attacks". On 26 February, UNDOF personnel heard multiple explosions on the Alpha side. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces relayed to UNDOF that United Nations personnel on the Alpha side should go into shelter. The United Nations personnel went into their bunkers, where they stayed for about 30 minutes. UNDOF assessed some of the detonations to be from the activated Iron Dome system.

6. On 12 March, United Nations personnel at United Nations positions in the northern part of the area of operations observed 10 rockets fired from north of their positions. Shortly thereafter, they noticed the Iron Dome system intercept rockets, and also observed heavy explosions in the vicinity of Majdal Shams on the Alpha side. The Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that: "This morning approximately 100 rockets were launched towards Israeli territory from Lebanon". On 7 April, United Nations personnel in the central part of the area of operations heard several missiles being intercepted in the area.

7. On 12 March, UNDOF personnel also observed explosions in the area of limitation on the Bravo side. Subsequently, the Israel Defense Forces conveyed to UNDOF that they had "attacked three (3) military rooms IVO [in the vicinity of] Ufaniya and Hanud", adding that: "The State of Israel will not allow Hezbollah's presence in Syria to exist and will continue to act accordingly against them…. The IDF holds the Syrian regime and Syrian Arab Armed Forces (SAAF) responsible for upholding Syrian sovereignty and will not allow Iran-backed militias to carry out attacks against the State of Israel". On 16 March, United Nations personnel at observation post 57 heard several detonations and explosions on the Alpha side. One hour later, UNDOF personnel in the southern part of the area of separation noticed one artillery projectile fired from the Alpha side impact Rafid on the Bravo side and four rockets impact Tasil, also on the Bravo side.

8. On 21 March, United Nations personnel noticed an explosion in the vicinity of observation post 57. An UNDOF patrol deployed to the site of the explosion found approximately 20 individuals, some in military attire, including one person who was wounded, and a damaged bus. The UNDOF patrol also found what it assessed to be a crater and remnants of an explosion.

9. On 30 March, United Nations personnel in the southern part of the area of separation observed three rockets fly from the Bravo side over United Nations observation post 58 towards the Alpha side. Shortly thereafter, UNDOF personnel observed one aircraft from the Alpha side fly across the ceasefire line and over the area of separation, firing one missile into the area of limitation on the Bravo side.

10. On 4 April, UNDOF personnel in the southern part of the area of separation heard seven detonations and observed three rockets launched from the Alpha side impact Rafid in the area of separation.

11. On 8 April, United Nations personnel in the southern part of the area of separation observed eight projectiles fired from the central part of the area of limitation on the Alpha side impacting Rafid in the area of separation. United Nations personnel on the Alpha side also observed one main battle tank fire three rounds towards the area of separation. On 24 April, United Nations personnel at the Qunaytirah crossing heard several bursts of machine gun fire and observed one explosion in the area of separation. The following day, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that, on 24 April, "the IDF removed SAAF Observation Post within the area of separation … The IDF will not hesitate to act in order to protect its civilians and the Israeli sovereignty regarding violations such as these."

12. Late on 13 April and early on 14 April, United Nations personnel at various positions in the UNDOF area of operations observed multiple projectiles fired from the Israeli-occupied Golan and heard several explosions. UNDOF assessed that those incidents were related to the activated Iron Dome system. UNDOF personnel also noticed one drone fly in an easterly direction. United Nations personnel also noticed multiple artillery rounds fired from the Alpha side being intercepted on the Bravo side. Early on 14 April, the Israel Defense Forces relayed information to UNDOF that: "Last night, Iran initiated an attack against Israel, launching over 300 threats of various types … 99% of the threats launched towards Israeli territory were intercepted – a very significant strategic achievement. The IDF will do whatever it takes to protect the citizens of the State of Israel."

13. On multiple occasions during the reporting period, United Nations personnel in the UNDOF area of operations went into shelter due to heavy firing and explosions, including when the Israeli Iron Dome system was activated to intercept rockets fired from Lebanon towards Israel.

14. On 14 occasions during the reporting period, Israel Defense Forces personnel restricted the movement of UNDOF on the Alpha side. On 28 April, approximately 25 civilians blocked a road in the area of limitation on the Bravo side, denying access to a scheduled UNDOF patrol. On all of these occasions of restriction of movement, UNDOF patrols left the locations.

15. On 21 February, United Nations personnel observed several Israel Defense Forces personnel crossing the ceasefire line and moving in the area of separation, from which they apprehended one individual and took that person to the Alpha side, where they detained him. The following day, UNDOF, in cooperation with the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian authorities, facilitated the return of the individual through the Qunaytirah crossing. On 26 February, UNDOF also facilitated the return of one individual from the Bravo side who had been detained on 25 February by the Israel Defense Forces. On 16 March, UNDOF, in coordination with both sides, facilitated the return of one individual from the Bravo side who had allegedly crossed the ceasefire line through the Qunaytirah crossing. On 17 March, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that one individual from the Bravo side had allegedly crossed the ceasefire line and repeatedly interfered with the Israeli technical fence. The Israel Defense Forces also relayed to UNDOF that their personnel had fired gunshots, injuring the person, who later succumbed to his wounds. On the same day, UNDOF, in coordination with both sides, facilitated the return of the remains of the individual through the Qunaytirah crossing. On 28 April, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that, on 25 April, one individual from the Bravo side had been detained by Israel Defense Forces personnel for allegedly crossing the ceasefire line. UNDOF continued to engage with the International Committee of the Red Cross regarding the individual.

16. On two occasions on 23 February, United Nations personnel observed two military helicopters of the Armed Forces of the Russian Federation flying from the area of limitation on the Bravo side across the Bravo line and briefly over the area of separation. On 16 April, United Nations personnel observed 18 drones flying from the Alpha side and crossing the ceasefire line towards the Bravo side, where they disappeared.

17. Sporadic heavy explosions and bursts of heavy machine gun and small arms fire persisted in the areas of separation and limitation on the Bravo side. UNDOF assessed that the military activity was the result of the controlled detonation of unexploded ordnance as part of clearance operations by the Syrian armed forces. UNDOF observed the continued presence of Syrian security forces, some of whom were armed, staffing several checkpoints within the area of separation.

18. The continued presence of Iron Dome systems, armoured vehicles, artillery systems and multiple rocket launcher systems in the area of limitation on the Alpha side also constitutes a violation in each case. Pursuant to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, the presence of any unauthorized military equipment or personnel in the areas of separation and limitation is a violation of the Agreement.

19. UNDOF protested to the parties with regard to all violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement that it had observed, including the firing into and across the area of separation, as well as across the ceasefire line, the presence of unauthorized equipment and personnel in the areas of separation and limitation, and the crossing of the ceasefire line by Israel Defense Forces personnel and by drones and aircraft, as well as by civilians from the Bravo side. UNDOF liaised closely with the parties to de-escalate the situation, including during periods of heightened tension. In addition, UNDOF protested all restrictions on the movement of UNDOF personnel carrying out their mandated activities.

20. UNDOF continued to observe daily crossings of the ceasefire line by unidentified individuals from the Bravo side. It assessed that the individuals were shepherds and farmers from the surrounding areas tending livestock, as well as hunters carrying weapons. The Israel Defense Forces continued to express deep concern about the crossings, which they stated were a threat to the safety and security of their personnel operating in proximity to the ceasefire line. On several occasions, the Israel Defense Forces fired shots to discourage individuals from approaching the Israeli technical fence.

21. UNDOF continued to coordinate with both parties regarding the distribution by the Syrian authorities of identity cards to the shepherds in the local community in the area of separation to enable them to move within the vicinity of the ceasefire line and to prevent the recurrence of incidents involving the firing of warning shots.

22. The Permanent Representative of the Syrian Arab Republic to the United Nations addressed several letters to the President of the Security Council and to the Secretary-General. In a letter dated 17 March 2024 (A/78/816-S/2024/246), the Permanent Representative conveyed that: “On 17 March 2024 at 0042 hours, as part of their continued flagrant violations of the sovereignty of Syrian territory and the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, the Israeli occupation forces launched an airstrike from the direction of the occupied Syrian Golan at a number of points in the southern region, resulting in material losses”. In a letter dated 19 March 2024 (A/78/817-S/2024/248), he stated that “on 19 March 2024, … Israeli occupation forces launched an airstrike from the direction of the occupied Syrian Golan at a number of military points in Rif Dimashq, resulting in material losses”. The Permanent Representative also stated that this “underscores yet again the Israeli occupation forces’ continued flagrant violations of the sovereignty of Syrian territory and the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement”. The Permanent Representative, in a letter dated 3 May 2024 (A/78/877-S/2024/361), conveyed that on “2 May 2024, in a continuation of the occupying Israeli entity’s attacks against the territorial sovereignty of the Syrian Arab Republic, as well as its repeated violations of the 1974 Disengagement of Forces Agreement, the Israeli enemy launched an aerial attack from the airspace of the occupied Syrian Golan against a location in the environs of Damascus, injuring eight soldiers and causing material losses”.

23. UNDOF assessed that the security situation generally remained calm in the northern and central parts of its area of operations on the Bravo side but continued to be volatile in the southern part, with security incidents reportedly occurring in locations within the area of limitation. This included along UNDOF patrol routes in Dar‘a Governorate. Open sources reported security incidents in Jasim, Nawa, Tafas and Muzayrib towns in the southern part of the area of limitation involving armed and

improvised explosive device attacks targeting checkpoints and convoys of the Syrian security forces, as well as other government authorities and former members of armed opposition groups.


24. Since early March 2020, the Israel Defense Forces have restricted the movement of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel through the Alpha gate at the Qunaytirah crossing, requiring advance notice of movement, which has adversely affected the operational and administrative activities of the mission. Since the attack by Hamas against Israel on 7 October 2023 and subsequent developments in Israel and the Occupied Palestinian Territory, the Israel Defense Forces have further limited these movements at the Qunaytirah crossing. On 15 April, the Israel Defense Forces informed UNDOF that: "Due to the current security situation in Israel, the IDF has put up blockades in sensitive and dangerous areas throughout the country for the safety of its citizens as well as United Nations personnel" and "blocked" access to a temporary United Nations observation post, as the road leading to it "is in a sensitive and dangerous area". While the Israel Defense Forces slightly eased some of their restrictions, UNDOF continued to liaise with them on their full facilitation of the crossing of UNDOF and Observer Group Golan personnel at the Qunaytirah crossing, and on the need for United Nations personnel to cross using only documents issued by UNDOF at the crossing and to return to the established crossing procedures. The Syrian authorities returned to the procedures established to facilitate the movement of UNDOF personnel and supplies through the Bravo gate at the Qunaytirah crossing. On 28 April, Israel Defense Forces personnel at a checkpoint denied access to a scheduled UNDOF patrol in the area of limitation on the Alpha side. On the same day, a scheduled UNDOF patrol was denied access by approximately 25 civilians who blocked a road and signalled to the patrol to turn back in the area of limitation on the Bravo side.

25. UNDOF continued to engage with the Israel Defense Forces with a view to addressing restrictions on the movement and access of United Nations personnel from the Alpha side, through the Israeli technical fence, to United Nations observation posts in the area of separation.

26. UNDOF, with the facilitation of the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian authorities, continued to carry out, through Observer Group Golan, fortnightly inspections of the military positions of the Israel Defense Forces and the Syrian security forces in select parts of the respective areas of limitation. UNDOF continued to engage with both parties to facilitate the expansion of the inspections in their respective positions in the various parts of the areas of limitation.

27. As part of the return to full mandate implementation on the Bravo side, UNDOF continued with the restoration, repainting and refurbishment of the barrels marking the ceasefire line and the Bravo line, which delineate the area of separation, with 129 barrels restored to date along the ceasefire line and 153 barrels along the Bravo line (see figure I). UNDOF continued to consult with the parties on the barrel refurbishment and, in some instances, replacement activity.


Figure I
Number of ceasefire line and Bravo line barrels restored, repainted and refurbished by the Force



28. The main construction of the new United Nations position 17A, in the northern part of the area of separation, was completed in May, with the construction of the bunkers ongoing and the full reoccupation of the position anticipated in June. Progress towards the reconstruction of unoccupied United Nations observation post 52 has been slow since 7 October 2023. On 8 May, Observer Group Golan and UNDOF conducted a reconnaissance visit to the observation post to assess the situation in preparation for its reconstruction. The reoccupation of this observation post will complete the return of Observer Group Golan to all observation posts that the military observers temporarily vacated in 2014 owing to the deterioration in the security situation (see figure II).

Figure II


Number of reoccupied Force positions and United Nations Truce Supervision Organization military observers in Observer Group Golan positions on the Bravo side since 2017



29. UNDOF operations continued to be supported by the military observers of the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization in Observer Group Golan, who are under the operational control of the UNDOF Force Commander and maintain 10 fixed observation posts within the UNDOF area of operations. The focus of Observer Group Golan remained on continuous static observation and situational awareness. In addition, the military observers are tasked with carrying out investigations of incidents within the UNDOF area of operations.

30. UNDOF monthly operational patrols continued in the areas of separation and limitation, with 1,130 operational activities carried out in March, 1,097 in April and 672 by 12 May (see figure III). UNDOF patrol routes cover the full breadth of the area of separation and 70 per cent of the area of limitation on the Bravo side. The volatile security situation in the southern sector continued to hinder progress in opening new patrol routes in the area of limitation on the Bravo side.

Figure III
Number of Force patrols carried out per month



31. While the movement of UNDOF personnel continued to be restricted by Lebanese administrative requirements, since 16 February, the Lebanese authorities has streamlined some of the procedures to facilitate the movement of UNDOF vehicles between the Syrian Arab Republic and Lebanon. The route between Beirut and Damascus, through the Judaydah and Masna‘ border crossing, which is a primary resupply route for UNDOF, remained open for the commercial movement of goods and personnel during the period. It is also the main route for UNDOF troops rotating through Beirut.

32. UNDOF continued to assess that there remained a significant threat to United Nations personnel in its area of operations from explosive remnants of war, including unexploded ordnance and mines, as well as a possible threat as a result of localized violence, including the possible presence of sleeper cells of armed groups.

33. UNDOF continually conducts assessments of and updates contingency plans for the reinforcement, extraction and evacuation of positions and observation posts on both the Alpha and Bravo sides, in addition to regular rehearsals, exercises and training for various contingencies. Risk mitigation measures, including force protection measures, continue to be developed at positions, observation posts and the operational base at Camp Ziouani and headquarters at Camp Faouar.

34. UNDOF reported no cases of misconduct. The mission continued to implement activities, including the regular training of personnel related to prevention, enforcement and remedial actions regarding misconduct.

35. As at 14 May, UNDOF comprised 1,139 troops, including 91 women peacekeepers. Troops were deployed from Argentina (1), Australia (1), Bhutan (4), Czechia (3), Fiji (149), Ghana (5), India (201), Ireland (4), Kazakhstan (139), Nepal (415), the Republic of Korea (1), Uruguay (213) and Zambia (3). In addition, 77 military observers from Observer Group Golan, including 14 women personnel, assisted UNDOF in carrying out its tasks.

III. Implementation of Security Council resolution 338 (1973)

36. In its resolution 2718 (2023), the Security Council called upon the parties concerned to immediately implement its resolution 338 (1973). It decided to renew the mandate of UNDOF for a period of six months, until 30 June 2024, and requested the Secretary-General to report every 90 days on developments in the situation and the measures taken to implement resolution 338 (1973). The search for a peaceful settlement of the conflict in the Middle East, in particular the efforts made at various levels to implement resolution 338 (1973), was addressed in the report of the Secretary-General on the situation in the Middle East (A/78/315), submitted pursuant to General Assembly resolution 77/26 entitled "The Syrian Golan".

37. Since the discontinuation of indirect peace talks in December 2008, there have been no negotiations between the parties. I look forward to a peaceful resolution of the conflict between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic and the resumption of efforts towards a comprehensive, just and durable peace settlement, as called for by the Security Council in its resolution 338 (1973) and other relevant resolutions.

IV. Financial aspects

38. The General Assembly, by its resolution 77/291 B of 30 June 2023, appropriated the amount of $69.3 million for the maintenance of the Force for the period from 1 July 2023 to 30 June 2024.

39. As at 30 April 2024, unpaid assessed contributions to the special account for UNDOF amounted to $27.6 million. The total outstanding assessed contributions for all peacekeeping operations as at that date amounted to $2,774.9 million.

40. Reimbursement of troop costs, as well as reimbursement of the costs of contingent-owned equipment, have been made for the period up to 31 December 2023, in accordance with the quarterly payment schedule.

V. Observations

41. At a time of volatility in the region, I remain concerned about the continued violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement, including multiple breaches of the ceasefire. Any firing across the ceasefire line is in violation of the Agreement and must cease. The Israel Defence Forces must refrain from firing into the area of separation and across the ceasefire line, as well as from crossing the ceasefire line. I also remain concerned by the continued presence of the Syrian armed forces in the area of separation. There should be no military forces or activities in the area of separation other than those of UNDOF. The continued presence of unauthorized weapons and equipment in the areas of limitation on both the Alpha and the Bravo sides, as well as the flying of aircraft and drones across the ceasefire line and over the area of separation, are in violation of the Agreement. I urge the parties to the Agreement to exercise utmost restraint and comply with the Agreement. I continue to encourage members of the Security Council to support efforts to raise the awareness of both parties of the risk of escalation and the need to preserve the ceasefire between Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic.

42. It remains critical that the parties maintain their liaison with UNDOF. All violations of the ceasefire line increase tensions between the signatories to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement of 1974 and undermine stability in the area. The continued liaison by UNDOF with the parties has contributed to de-escalation during times of heightened tensions in the region.

43. The continued commitment of both Israel and the Syrian Arab Republic to the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and support for the presence of UNDOF remain essential. The full return of UNDOF to the area of separation remains a priority for the Force. I count on the continued cooperation of both parties to facilitate the advancement of the Force's plans for an incremental return to operations and positions in the area of separation and to ensure that the Force can implement its mandate fully, including the extension of inspections on both sides. I am concerned by the restrictions on the movement of UNDOF in its area of operations, including at the Alpha gate at Qunaytirah crossing. At the same time, the parties must continue to support the enhancement of the liaison function of UNDOF.

44. Given the worrying trend of continued violations of the Disengagement of Forces Agreement and the volatile security situation in the southern sector of the area of limitation on the Bravo side, the safety and security of military and civilian personnel in UNDOF and Observer Group Golan are of particular concern. The parties must refrain from any activity that may risk the safety of the peacekeepers. It is therefore of particular importance that the Security Council continue to bring to bear its influence on the concerned parties to ensure that UNDOF is accorded the ability to operate safely and securely, and is allowed to operate freely in accordance with the Agreement. It remains important that the parties also continue to facilitate the deployment of all personnel to UNDOF for effective mandate implementation.

45. The continued support of Member States, and in particular the confidence of troop-contributing countries in UNDOF and their commitment to it, remain key factors in the Force's ability to carry out its mandate. I am grateful to the Governments of Argentina, Australia, Bhutan, Czechia, Fiji, Ghana, India, Ireland, Kazakhstan, Nepal, the Republic of Korea, Uruguay and Zambia for their contributions and the commitment, resolve and consummate professionalism of their military personnel in UNDOF. In addition, I thank Ireland for providing military personnel who served as the UNDOF Force reserve company from September 2013 to April 2024. I am also thankful to the Member States that have contributed military observers to the United Nations Truce Supervision Organization.

46. I consider the continued presence of UNDOF in the area essential. I therefore recommend that the Security Council extend the mandate of the Force for six months, until 31 December 2024. The Government of the Syrian Arab Republic has given its assent to the proposed extension. The Government of Israel has also expressed its agreement.

47. In conclusion, I wish to express my appreciation to the Head of Mission and Force Commander, Lieutenant General Nirmal Kumar Thapa, the military and civilian personnel serving under his leadership in UNDOF, and the military observers in Observer Group Golan, who continue to perform the important tasks assigned to them by the Security Council with efficiency and commitment, under extremely challenging circumstances.

Map


UNDOF
JUNE 2024
UNITED NATIONS
Geospatial
LEBANON
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC
GOLAN
Line "Alpha"
Line "Alpha 1"
Line "Bravo"
Camp Faouar
Camp Ziouani
Shaba
Majdal Chams
Mas'adah
Buq'ātā
Taranjah
Jubāta al Khashab
Ufānīyah
Baath
Arnabah
Khān
Hamidiyah
Mansoura
Al Qunaytirah
'Ayn Ziwan
Kafr Naffākh
Fazarah
Al Khushniyah
Al 'Asbah
Ar Rafid
Butmiyah
Jūkhadār
Khisfīn
Kefar el Ma
Al 'Al
Fiq
Umm Sharq
Ash Sajarah
Saḥam al Jawlan
Ḥadar
Harfā
Mazra'at Bayt Jinn
Bayt Jinn
'Arnah
Ḥīnah
Baytīmā
Al Kiswah
Arṭūz
Sa'sa'
Jabā
Masḥarah
Umm Bāṭinah
Umm Tinah
Ar Ruwayḥīnah
Nab aş Şakhr
Bi'r al 'Ajam
Burayqah
Al Ḥārrah
'Aqrabā
Kafr Nāij
Kafr Shams
Aş Şanamayn
An Nakhl
Qāsim
Nawá
Tasīl
Izra'
Dā'il
Transarabian Pipeline
PALESTINE BELT GRID
0 5 10km
0 2 4mi
UNDOF Components
HQ OGG HQ (CF)
FIJI
LOG INDIA / NEPAL
NEPAL (+)
NEPAL
URUGUAY
FRC IRELAND
INDIA
MP INDIA
HQ UNDOF HQ
NEPAL (-)
FRC IRELAND
LOG INDIA / NEPAL
NEPAL
INDIA
MP INDIA
OGG observation post
OGG unoccupied observation post
OGG temporary observation post
UNDOF position
UNDOF unoccupied position
Administrative capital
Town, village
International boundary
Special boundary line
Line "Alpha" or "Bravo"
Railway
Highway
Main road
Secondary road
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Map No. 2916 Rev. 132
Jun 2024